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AN ASSESSMENT OF CROSS-NATIONAL
REGULATORY BURDEN COMPARISONS
Thomas D. Hopkins∗
Governments everywhere engage in activities that impose burdens on
individuals and businesses. These activities are undertaken in order to
generate benefits of many types. Some of these burdens and benefits are
readily measurable, particularly those taking the form of financial
transactions, such as taxes and fees collected. Such payments are routinely
and closely monitored, in ways permitting comparisons among countries.
National rankings have been available for many years that are based on
government revenues in the aggregate and relative to population, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and other metrics.
While payments by individuals and business to their governments are the
most visible and generally largest form of governmental burden, mandated
behavior catalogued in regulations also imposes a burden by requiring a
substantial expenditure of time and resources.1
Any portrayal of
governmental burden that ignores regulatory compliance costs is
misleading, particularly since governments are, to a considerable degree,
able to achieve objectives through varying mixes of fiscal and regulatory
measures. A government, for example, can construct a water filtration
plant using tax revenues, or require businesses to use their own funds to
construct it.2
Traditionally, far more public attention has been focused on fiscal
burden than on regulatory burden, largely due to the transparency of
∗

Professor of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, N.Y. The author
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1. See infra notes 5-11, 28-94 and accompanying text (detailing the burden of
regulatory compliance throughout the world).
2. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination: System B Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control
Program Addressing Storm Water Discharge, promulgated in 1999, “expands the existing
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program for storm water control.” U.S.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGUL. AFFAIRS, VALIDATING
REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES
145 (2005). The EPA estimates that this rule will impose a “total cost . . . on Federal and
State levels of government, and on the private sector, [of] $803.1 million annually.” Id.
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budgetary transactions. This is not surprising given the fragmented nature
of regulation, which arises independently in dozens of separate
governmental agencies and units. The importance of rectifying this
imbalance, and making the public more fully aware of regulatory burden,
has been underscored by a Canadian finding that “recent research,
particularly from the OECD, and better data on regulations, point to strong
and almost always negative links between the economic restrictiveness or
burden of the regulations and economic performance.”3 Similarly, a World
Bank working paper from 2005 concludes that “a heavier regulatory burden
reduces growth and increases [macroeconomic] volatility.”4
Of course, any portrayal of governmental activity that ignores whatever
benefits it may produce is incomplete, whether the action is a spending
program or a regulatory program.
Unfortunately, sufficient
characterizations of such benefits exist neither for fiscal actions nor for
regulatory actions. The fundamental question of whether the net effect of
particular governmental activities enhances societal well-being is rarely
answered adequately, either prospectively or retrospectively.
As for spending programs, an implicit reckoning exists, in that
government must finance its spending, putting in place a political and
financial constraint, the effectiveness of which varies over time and across
jurisdictions.5 No such inherent constraint exists, however, for regulatory
programs, which explains the rise in many countries of alternative
oversight mechanisms such as benefit-cost analytical requirements.6 Such
oversight mechanisms are used with varying success to supplement
whatever legislative review procedures may apply to both particular
spending and regulatory programs.7 The United States has made more
3. Fidele Ndayisenga & Andre Downs, Economic Impacts of Regulatory Convergence
Between Canada and the United States 3 (Gov’t of Can., Working Paper Series 008, 2005).
4. Norman V. Loayza et al., Regulation and Macroeconomic Performance 1 (World
Bank, Working Paper No. 3469, 2004); see id. at Part 18.
5. See W. MARK CRAIN, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS
ON SMALL FIRMS 1-4 (2005).
6. See generally U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 2 (providing the costs
and benefits of Federal regulations and recommendations for regulatory reforms); see also
AUSTRALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUS., HOLDING BACK THE RED TAPE
AVALANCHE: A REGULATORY REFORM AGENDA FOR AUSTRALIA 7 (2005). The Australian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), an organization whose membership includes
federal business organizations as well as major national industry associations in Australia,
proposed, as one of its suggested improvements of regulation cost, a regulatory budgeting
system whereby “[e]ach year the Prime Minister will present a regulatory budget that is a
compendium of the cost and benefit analysis of regulations enacted by government and
departments in the previous year.” Id. The ACCI also recognized that “[r]igorous
cost/benefit analysis of regulation is a fundamental component of the . . . process.” Id.
7. See CRAIN, supra note 5, at 2-3 (discussing limiting characteristics of using cost-
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headway than other nations in bringing benefit-cost principles to bear on
regulatory decision making, thanks to efforts of units within the Executive
Office of the President that have continued for over three decades.8 The
lead role on that front is now being taken by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), as detailed in its December 2005 report.9
Some estimates of overall regulatory compliance cost do exist for a few
countries, but they are less widely available and considerably less
standardized than are estimates of taxes and fees.10 Regulatory cost
estimates have been generated for the United States Government,11 and to a
much lesser extent for the governments of other countries. Estimates are
essentially non-existent for regulatory costs generated by units of
government other than at the national level. Countries vary substantially in
the mix of responsibilities carried out by the central government, as distinct
from regional units such as states and provincial governments. Thus,
comparing compliance cost estimates across nations is replete with
challenges—comprehensive data simply do not exist, and such data as can
be assembled lack comparability due to varying patterns of federalism.
In recent years, various comparisons across countries that are based on a
mix of “hard” statistics on narrowly-defined elements of regulation,
coupled with qualitative judgments, have become available.12 This Article
reviews such comparisons as proxies for regulatory burden measures. The
several rankings differ in scope and features, so it may be useful to precede
their review with some discussion of just what it is that regulation
encompasses.
Traditionally, the term “regulation” has generally been used to refer to
three clusters of governmental influence over the conduct of individuals
and businesses: antitrust policy, economic controls (constraints on business
entry/exit from markets and on product prices and quantities sold), and
health/safety/environmental
safeguards
(often
termed
“social”
regulation).13 This three-part categorization, for example, is the organizing
benefit analysis for assessing regulatory policy).
8. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 2, at 19-34.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 1, 3-34 (summarizing cost-benefit analytical review of eighty-eight
“major” Federal regulations); see also AUSTRALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUS.,
supra note 6, at 15 (providing overall regulatory costs for Australia during the 2004 fiscal
year); MARC A. MILES ET AL., 2006 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2006) (providing a
statistical analysis for regulatory schemes in 161 countries over twelve years); Ndayisenga
& Downs, supra note 3 (reviewing regulatory reform in Canada).
11. The most recent such estimates are those found in CRAIN, supra note 5, at 1
(estimating the total cost of federal regulation at between $34 billion and $39 billion).
12. See infra notes 28-95 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (4th
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framework of major textbooks such as that of Viscusi, Harrington and
Vernon.14
Their text identifies two mechanisms—price incentives
(primarily taxes) and direct controls on behavior—used by both the federal
and state governments within the United States to achieve objectives in
each of the three regulatory areas.15 In effect, this calls for a twelve-cell
matrix of regulation (three types, two enforcers, and two tools), and on at
least one dimension, that of the enforcer, numerous agencies populate the
“economic” and “social” cells of the matrix.16 Chart 1 illustrates what such
a framework entails; total regulatory burden would be the sum of the
heights of the twelve columns (heights shown here are purely
hypothetical).17 As will become clear in reviewing existing burden
measures, few studies attempt to encompass all twelve, and most confine
their reach to merely two—direct controls by the federal government in
“economic” and “social” areas.18
CHART 1: TYPES OF REGULATION—A CONCEPTUAL VIEW.
THE HEIGHT OF A COLUMN WOULD REPRESENT THE TOTAL BURDEN
ASSOCIATED WITH A PARTICULAR TYPE OF REGULATION.
If one wanted to work with a conceptualization that captures total
government burden, the fiscal dimension would need to be incorporated,
covering revenues raised in ways unrelated to the price incentive
mechanism identified by the Viscusi text.19 Then it would be important to
include both the actual revenues generated and the compliance burden
associated with their generation. That modification would add another four
columns. The compliance burden of federal taxation, in the form of the
time taxpayers devote to preparing tax forms, has been included in some
estimates.20
It is probably fair to say that the typology of regulation is in flux. The
approach taken by Crain organizes regulation into four clusters: economic,
workplace, environmental, and tax compliance, while excluding antitrust.21
ed. 2005).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 3.
16. See Chart 1, infra p. __.
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 28-93 and accompanying text.
19. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 13.
20. See, e.g., CRAIN, supra note 5, at 27-28.
21. Id. at 5.
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Crain finds that these clusters account for, respectively, roughly fifty-three,
ten, twenty and eighteen percent of total federal regulatory burden in the
United States22
An alternative framework that is becoming increasingly common, with
encouragement from the OMB and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) among others, distinguishes product
market regulation from labor market regulation, with mixed practice as to
whether antitrust is treated as part of the former (as in OECD reports) or
simply excluded from consideration (as in OMB reports).23 A similar
possibility is to apportion all regulation into clusters of “fiscal, labor and
output market, where the latter encompasses the regulation of entry, trade,
financial markets, bankruptcy and contract enforcement.”24 One pragmatic
appeal of this latter approach is that particular national ranking indices
falling within each cluster do appear to be more closely correlated with one
another than with those in the other two clusters.25
Were a tax compliance cluster to be included, it should reckon with
those government rules put in place for the purpose of implementing
government spending and revenue programs, occasioning real resource
transfers from or to targeted individuals and businesses over and above the
actual budgetary transaction itself. OMB’s 2005 report identifies a variety
of such regulations that implement federal budgetary programs, which it
terms “transfer rules,” and it excludes the costs of these regulations from its
overall calculations.26 OMB makes a “distinction between rules that
impose costs primarily through the imposition of taxes, and rules that
impose costs primarily through mandates on the private sector,” and OMB
estimates only cover the latter type of regulation.27
PROMINENT CURRENT RANKINGS OF NATIONAL REGULATORY
BURDEN
Five independent organizations have recently published country burden
rankings using data drawn from 2003 to 2005. The array of countries
covered by each study ranges from 30 to 161. While each study
prominently features regulation, the five rankings vary with respect to how
a regulatory burden is assessed and in the extent to which factors other than
22. Id. at 29.
23. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 34.
24. NORMAN V. LOAYZA ET AL., WORLD BANK, REGULATION
PERFORMANCE 19, 29 (2004).
25. Id. at 10.
26. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 2, at 16.
27. Id. at 16-17.
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regulation are incorporated. Each of the five ranking systems is discussed
in turn.
1) OECD: Product Market Regulation Indicator28
The focus of the OECD indicator is on product market regulation as
assessed by governmental officials in each of the thirty OECD member
nations, using an OECD questionnaire.29 The OECD administered one
questionnaire in 1998 and a second at the end of 2003.30 (The other four
rankings reviewed in this paper are updated annually.) The 2003
questionnaire collected approximately 800 data points ranging across
nearly 140 economy-wide or industry-specific regulatory areas, which were
converted into sixteen numerical indicators.31 These were then aggregated
into three clusters—extent of state control (weighted .29), barriers to
entrepreneurship (.30), and barriers to trade and investment (.41)—and then
to a single indicator of each country’s overall product market regulatory
burden.32 Antitrust was taken into account along with all economic
regulation. While “administrative regulation” was included, it would
appear that little of the burden from health/safety/environmental (social,
labor market) regulation was covered.33
According to the OECD findings for 2003, the countries with the least
burdensome regulatory systems are the United Kingdom, Australia, the
United States, New Zealand, Canada, Iceland, and Denmark.34 The most
burdensome systems are in Poland, Turkey, Mexico, Hungary, Greece,
Italy, Czech Republic, and France.35 The indices, scaled from zero to four,
however, vary only slightly across most countries; all but five of the thirty
countries have indices in the range 1.0 to 2.0. 36 The OECD pointed out
that the differences across half the countries lack statistical significance.37
OECD further noted that: (a) product market regulatory burden declined
in all OECD member countries from 1998 to 2003,38 (b) most regulatory
28. Paul Conway et al., Product Market Regulation in OECD Countries: 1998 to 2003,
3 (Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev., Working Paper No. 419, ECO/WKP, 2005), available at
www.oecd.org/eco.
29. See id. at 3.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 5-7.
32. See id. at 8.
33. Id. at 59.
34. Id. at 23 fig.10.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 32 (“Regulatory impediments to product market competition have declined in
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regimes became more homogeneous across countries,39 and (c) country
rankings changed little during the five-year period.40 Finally, in OECD’s
view, available evidence on labor market regulation suggests that similar
patterns probably exist in both these classes of regulation.41 The declining
burden pattern from 1998 to 2003 noted by OECD stands in sharp contrast
to Crain’s finding that the United States federal regulatory burden,
expressed on a per household basis, rose significantly from 1995 to 2004,
from $8,437 to $10,172.42
2) World Bank: Ease of Doing Business Indicator43
The World Bank collected data for January 2005 from some 150
countries on ten specific regulatory factors that bear on the ease of doing
business.44 This was the third annual such World Bank survey, each of
which was somewhat broader than its predecessor.45 The process entailed
consultation with over 3,500 individuals drawn from within and outside
governments.46 The World Bank concluded that “a high ranking on the
ease of doing business does mean that the government has created a
regulatory environment conducive to business operations.”47 Each
country’s ranking is a simple average of its percentile rankings on each of
the ten components, weighted equally. The ten components are the
strength of investor protection and the ease of: (1) starting a business, (2)
hiring and firing, (3) licensing, (4) registering property, (5) getting credit,
(6) paying taxes, (7) trading across borders, (8) enforcing contracts, and (9)
closing a business.48
These components relate primarily to the nature of economic regulation,
but they also incorporate some elements to encompass investor protection
and tax compliance simplicity. The rankings are not strictly based on
regulation; they represent informed opinion on particular indicators,
distinct from any estimation of overall regulatory costs.49 What the World
Bank rankings lose in comprehensiveness they gain in comparability across
the OECD area.”).
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 26.
42. See CRAIN, supra note 5, at 48.
43. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2006: CREATING JOBS (2006).
44. See id. at 77 (2006).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 92.
48. Id. at 93.
49. Id. at 91.
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countries.
The World Bank concluded that the greatest ease of doing business can
be found in New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, Canada and
Norway.50 At the other end of the spectrum, conditions are least conducive
to business in five African countries.51
3) World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index52
The intent of the annual Global Competitiveness Report set of rankings
is to highlight competitiveness characteristics of countries, combining basic
socioeconomic statistics with results of opinion surveys.53 The latest
edition, providing data as of mid-2005, covers 117 countries.54 In all, 139
different indicators are presented, grouped into nine broad classes. These
are aggregated into a single Global Competitiveness Index for each
country. 55
Burden of government regulation is one of the 139 indicators, but more
than a dozen other indicators also address regulatory burden.56 The
rankings for all but two of the regulation-related indicators are wholly
driven by the opinion survey, as distinct from hard statistics.57
Approximately 10,000 senior business executives worldwide, on average
ninety-four per country, completed a 150-item questionnaire during the
spring of 2005.58 In each country, a partner organization saw to the
implementation of the survey; in the United States, this organization was
the Council on Competitiveness.59 The burden of government regulation
ranking reflects responses to the following: “Complying with
administrative requirements (permits, regulations, reporting) issued by the
government in your country is (1=burdensome, 7=not burdensome).”60 By
that measure, the five least regulation-burdened countries (whose scores
were in the 4.5 to 5.4 range of the scale) were Singapore, Hong Kong SAR,

50. Id.
51. Id. at 92. The five African nations are Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic,
Burkina Fasa, and Congo Democratic Republic.
52. AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS ET AL., WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005-2006 (2005).
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 28-29.
55. Id. at 469-72.
56. Id. at 471-72.
57. Id. at 213-25.
58. Id. at 213-15. One hundred and fifty-eight U.S. business executives completed the
survey. Id.
59. Id. at ix, 215.
60. Id. at 556, tbl.6.07.
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Malaysia, Taiwan, and Finland.61 The U.S. ranked twentieth with a 3.6
score; Canada ranked twenty-ninth with 3.4. The five most regulationburdened countries (whose scores were in the 2.0-2.1 range) were Italy,
Peru, Brazil, Serbia & Montenegro, and Bosnia & Herzegovina.62
The World Economic Forum report sheds additional light on regulatory
burden, as each of the following indicators suggests.63 (Ranks are shown
only for the U.S. and Canada.)
TABLE 1: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM RANKINGS AMONG 117 NATIONS64
[1 IS MOST FAVORABLE]
EXCEPT WHERE NOTED, ALL RANKINGS ARE SURVEY-BASED.

U.S.

CANADA

Prevalence of trade barriers
Impact of rules on FDI

28
10

25
42

Agricultural policy costs
Ease of hiring foreign labor

52
64

50
67

Efficiency of legal framework
Property rights

17
2

20
18

Intellectual property protection
Favoritism in decisions of government officials

1
33

16
45

Extent of bureaucratic red tape
Effectiveness of national lawmaking bodies

35
9

24
14

Effectiveness of antitrust policy
Demanding regulatory standards (other than environmental)

6
5

12
15

Number of procedures required to start a business—World Bank report
Time required to start a business—World Bank report

10
4

1
2

Foreign ownership restrictions
Strength of auditing and accounting standards

14
2

25
16

Stringency of environmental regulations
Clarity and stability of environmental regulations

19
17

16
14

Extent of government-mandated environmental reporting
Effects of environmental compliance on business

9
11

14
19

Effects of privatization on competition and the environment

11

14

It is difficult to discern a meaningful pattern in these results, which may

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 486-89, 528, 551-59, 579, 611-12, 616-20.
The author compiled this data from the World Economic Forum report.
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mean that regulatory structures vary sharply, at least as they are perceived
across countries.
The survey instrument also provided an opportunity for respondents in
each country to select, from a list of fourteen, the five most “problematic
factors for doing business.”65 In the United States, three regulatory matters
are among the most troublesome five: tax regulations, inefficient
government bureaucracy, and restrictive labor regulations.66
At the most aggregate level of the indices, the “Global Competitiveness
Index,” the highest ranked five countries are the United States, Finland,
Denmark, Switzerland and Singapore.67 The worst rankings are assigned to
Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi and East Timor. Canada’s rank is number
thirteen.68
The World Economic Forum’s approach has the virtue of exploring
many different facets of the business setting in a large array of countries,
attempting to rely upon comparable constructs in each. It demonstrates
how difficult it is to distinguish regulatory concerns from other concerns;
regulatory benefits and burdens are in some instances construed on a net
benefit (or net burden) basis, and in others just the burden is referenced.
While the survey approach has much merit, it is not clear that tracking the
views of 158 U.S. business executives (and generally fewer in other
countries) about diverse regulatory issues yields reliable results,
particularly when individual perceptions can be colored by unique cultural
and historical factors.
4) Heritage/Wall Street Journal: Index of Economic Freedom69
The Index of Economic Freedom is an annual assessment of how 161
countries compare on fifty indicators that are grouped into ten “factors” of
economic freedom.70 One of the ten factors is regulation, but at least two
others also encompass aspects of regulation as the concept is construed in
this paper; namely, trade policy, wages and prices (i.e., wage-price
controls), and possibly government intervention in the economy (although
this is interpreted as degree of government ownership, which is not a
regulatory matter).71 The rankings rely on data from late 2004 to early

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 214.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
See generally MILES ET AL., supra note 10.
See id. at 56.
See id.
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2005.72
The approach taken entails no surveys; rather, the authors assign
numerical scores (from one to five) to each of the ten factors, and a simple
average is computed as the overall score for the rankings.73 For each of the
factors, a set of criteria is specified to guide the scoring process, and the
data used are identified.74 The process is a mix of judgmental and datadetermined considerations, depending on the indicator. For example, the
most favorable score achievable for the regulation factor is “1,” which
indicates that, “[e]xisting regulations straightforward and applied uniformly
to all businesses; regulations not much of a burden for business; corruption
nearly nonexistent.”75 By contrast, a score of “5” indicates “[g]overnmentset production quotas and some state planning; government regulations
virtually impede creation of new businesses; corruption widespread;
regulations applied randomly.”76
Only three countries received scores of “1” on regulation: Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Denmark.77 Sixteen countries scored “5.”78 The United
States’ score was “2,” as was Canada’s.79 As for trade policy and for
wages and prices, both the United States and Canada scored “2.”80
The overall rankings, incorporating all ten factors, place the following
countries in the top five: Hong Kong, Singapore, Ireland, Luxembourg, and
Iceland.81 At the bottom of the rankings are North Korea, Iran, Burma,
Zimbabwe, and Venezuela.82 The United States ranked ninth and Canada
ranked twelfth (although the two countries have virtually the same
numerical score of 1.84 and 1.85, respectively).83
The Index of Economic Freedom has the appealing feature of covering a
large number of countries with clear criteria applied by a single set of
analysts, as distinct from an opinion survey from business executives
across the globe. But it remains heavily judgmental and at a level of

72. See id. at 57.
73. Id. at 56-57.
74. Id. at 58-74.
75. Id. at 72.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 412-14.
78. Id. at 414. These countries were Bosnia & Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, Togo,
Sierra Leone, Bangladesh, Vietnam, the Republic of Congo, Haiti, Turkmenistan, Laos,
Cuba, Libya, Zimbabwe, Burma, Iran, and North Korea. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 412.
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abstraction that makes it difficult to discern particular obstacles or
opportunities for government improvement. Its greatest value is probably
in drawing fairly clear lines between countries that have sharply differing
burdens, as distinct from clarifying whether countries scoring a two or a
three, for example, on any factor are actually and substantially dissimilar.
5) Fraser Institute: Economic Freedom of the World Index84
The Economic Freedom of the World Index, published by the Fraser
Institute, is an annual series that ranks 127 countries on “the degree to
which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic
freedom.”85 The most recent ranking, issued in September 2005, reports on
conditions prevailing in 2003.86 The report relies on thirty-eight indicators
(fewer for some countries due to missing data) in constructing ratings for
five areas:
(1) “Size of Government Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises” (five
“hard data” components)87
(2) “Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights” (five judgmental
components)88
(3) “Access to Sound Money” (four “hard data” components) 89
(4) “Freedom to Trade Internationally” (three of the nine components are
regulatory indicators drawn from the Global Competitiveness Report’s
survey)90
(5) “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business” (fifteen components,
nine of which are survey-based indicators drawn from the Global
Competitiveness Report)91
The top five rankings in the most recent index went to Hong Kong,
Singapore, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States. Canada
ranked seventh, with a score barely below that of the United States (8.0 and
8.2, respectively, out of ten points).92 The bottom four included Myanmar,
84. JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., FRASER INST., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2005
ANNUAL REPORT (2005).
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 6-8.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 12.
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Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with
Guinea-Bissau and Burundi tied for fifth-from-the-bottom rank.93 Table 2
provides sub-rankings for Canada and the United States.
TABLE 2: FRASER INSTITUTE RANKINGS AMONG 127 NATIONS94
CATEGORY
Freedom to trade internationally
Credit market regulations
Labor market regulations
Business regulations

U.S.
32
9
10
12

CANADA
26
19
25
15

The regulatory burden components of the Fraser and World
Economic Forum rankings overlap considerably. The Fraser approach
categorizes areas in ways that are more consistent with the regulatory
structure outlined at the start of this paper, and it draws on a mix of hard
statistical data and judgments about conditions. There is a year greater
delay in producing the annual Fraser rankings than in the other three annual
series’ here reviewed.
RANKINGS COMPARISON
To aid in exploring similarities and differences among these ranking
systems, Table 3 standardizes them by excluding those countries not ranked
by all five studies. The smallest array is that of the OECD (thirty
countries), but one of the OECD countries, Luxembourg, is excluded from
one of the larger studies. Thus, Table 3 contains the rankings of twentynine countries. In other words, to promote comparability across rankings,
if country X actually was ranked sixtieth in one of the larger studies, Table
3 shows what happens to country X’s ranking in that study once all nonOECD members and Luxembourg are deleted, pushing its rank up to, say,
twenty-fifth out of the twenty-nine.

93. Id.
94. Data for the United States and Canada can be found at GWARTNEY ET. AL, supra note
84, at 14-16. One is the most favorable ranking.
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TABLE 3: COUNTRIES RANKED FROM LEAST (1) TO MOST (29)
BURDENED95

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Rep.
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
U.K.
U.S.

OECD
1.5
14
14
8.5
22
6
10.5
22
14
24
26
3.5
6
25
10.5
17.5
27
14
6
17.5
29
19.5
14
19.5
8.5
22
28
1.5
3.5

WORLD
BANK
19
5
14
3
21
6
11
23
15
28
24
10
9
26
8
17
27
16
1
4
25
22
20
18
12
13
29
7
2

WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
14.5
12.5
17
10
21
2.5
2.5
10
5
27
23
12.5
18.5
25
8
16
28
10
18.5
14.5
26
22
24
20
6
4
29
7
1

HERITAGE/WSJ
6
12
16
8.5
15
4
8.5
25
13.5
27
22
2.5
1
24
17
26
28
11
6
18.5
23
18.5
21
20
13.5
10
29
2.5
6

FRASER
INSTITUTE
7
9.5
14.5
5
24
9.5
12
22.5
13
22.5
14.5
9.5
6
25.5
18.5
21
27
9.5
2
16.5
28
20
25.5
18.5
16.5
2
29
4
2

Note, in particular, from Table 3, the consistency among the top and

95. The author compiled this data based on the above-referenced reports. See
GWARTNEY ET. AL, supra note 84, at 14-16; LOPEZ-CLAROS ET AL., supra note 52, at 28-29;
MILES ET AL., supra note 10, at 412-14; WORLD BANK, supra note 43, at 91-92; Conway et
al., supra note 28, at 23.
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bottom rankings. For example, four countries—the United States, the
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Canada—rank among the least burdened
ten in all five studies. At the other extreme, five countries—Italy, Greece,
Poland, Mexico and Turkey—rank among the most burdened ten in all five
studies. Two countries—Mexico and Turkey—received virtually identical
rankings in all five studies. By contrast, the rankings of three countries—
New Zealand, Ireland and Australia—varied by as much as 17.5 ranks
across the studies, showing substantial differences in their assessments.
Table 4 shows overall how closely correlated the five ranking systems
turn out to be statistically. The World Economic Forum rankings are
somewhat more unique than are those of the other four studies. The
rankings of Heritage and Fraser are highly inter-correlated, as are those of
OECD and Heritage.
TABLE 4: CORRELATIONS AMONG THE FIVE RANKING SYSTEMS96
OECD

WORLD BANK

WORLD
ECONOMIC

WORLD BANK

0.778

WORLD
ECONOMIC

0.650

0.709

HERITAGE

0.867

0.772

0.660

FRASER

0.758

0.792

0.686

HERITAGE

0.877

CONCLUSIONS
All of the country ranking systems reviewed in this paper are most
useful in differentiating those countries in the least burdened group, for
example, those in the twentieth or thirty-fifth percentile, from those at the
other extreme, the most burdened countries. Their ability to make finer
distinctions among those in the middle group is limited by the narrowness
of the differences in the scoring each relies upon.
While each of the five ranking systems has its own unique appeal, there
is greater commonality than distinction among them. This finding is in
accord with a review by Nicoletti and Pryor of three earlier (1997-98)
96

The author compiled these correlations. Each correlation in Table 4 is statistically
significant at the .001 level; that is, the odds of achieving these correlations by chance are
less than one in a thousand.
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rankings for OECD member countries, distinguishing those that primarily
are driven by hard data from those that primarily rest on opinion surveys;
Nicoletti and Pryor concluded that results of the three rankings were largely
consistent: “overall perceptions of government regulations by business
leaders and experts and the objective assessment of formal regulations
appear to be relatively well aligned.”97
The five ranking systems offer neither truly comprehensive pictures nor
cost estimates of regulatory burden, but each taps much of what burdens
private commerce. Country-specific studies undertaken in the United
States, Canada, and Australia that do attempt to estimate total regulatory
costs generally put them in the neighborhood of ten percent of GDP. For
example, a report issued by the Government of Canada in October 2005
cites studies suggesting that regulatory compliance costs approximately
eight percent of GDP in the United States and twelve percent of GDP in
Canada.98 A 2005 Australian study puts its regulatory burden at ten
percent of GDP.99
When such findings are considered in the context of multi-country
rankings, it seems plausible to conclude that regulatory burdens in most of
the rest of the world must absorb well over ten percent of GDP, given that
the United States, Canada, and Australia consistently rank among the lessburdened countries. This in turn suggests that efforts to lessen regulatory
burdens could have dramatic payback in improved economic performance
worldwide. Certainly, although varying in relative magnitude, regulatory
compliance costs are large in most of the world. The rankings surveyed in
this paper suggest which parts of the world might be the most promising
areas for regulatory burden reduction initiatives.

97. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Frederic Pryor, Subjective and Objective Measures of the
Extent of Government Regulation, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. (forthcoming 2006).
98. Ndayisenga & Downs, supra note 3, at 9.
99. AUSTRALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUS., supra note 6, at 14.

